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T
raditionally, the severity of accidents in the chemical process industries has been
gauged on the basis of the human lives lost1-5. However, factors such as loss of assets,
contamination of the surroundings, and the resultant trauma also contribute to a very
large extent towards the adverse impacts of such accidents.
We have developed Accident Hazard Index (AHI) as a new system for a comprehensive yet
rapid assessment of the damage caused by accidents in the chemical process industries. The
index can also be used to assess the impacts of accidents likely in a yet-to-be-commissioned
industry on the basis of site characteristics and the industry’ s process and operational details;
the index thus enables one to choose between possible sites for setting up a new industry.
Keywords: hazard indices; hazard identi® cation; hazard ranking; hazard assessment;
industrial hazards.
INTRODUCTION
Since the days of industrial revolution accidents have been
occurring in the chemical process industries. But the
frequency as well as severity of these accidents have
signi® cantly increased during the last few decades as the
pace of industrialization,as well as the density of population
near industrial complexes, have increased rapidlywith time.
Table 1 presents examples of some of the larger accidents of
the last 25 years. It may be seen that the adverse impacts of
the accidents depend not only on the type of industry but
also on its surroundings.
Most accidents in the chemical process industries are
caused either by material failure (such as cracks in storage
vessels), operational errors (such as raising the pressure/
temperature/¯ ow-rate beyond critical limits), or external
perturbation (such as damage caused by a projectile). Some
accidents have catastrophic consequences. For example, the
Bhopal gas tragedy of 1984 killed or maimed over 20,000
people and the LPG terminal accident at Mexico City in the
same year claimed 600 lives. There have been numerous
other accidents in which the death toll would have been as
high as in Bhopal and Mexico, if the areas where the
accidents took place were not less densely populated.
Apart from causing damage to property and claiming
human lives, many accidents also cause long-term contami-
nation of the surroundings. For example, in the well-known
Seveso disaster6, which occurred near Milan, Italy, in 1976,
about 2 kg of TCDD (tetrachloro dibenzo dioxin) was
released. TCDD is one of the most toxic and persistent
chemicals known6 and decontamination of the affected area
posed a very serious problem in spite of the low quantities
involved. Some authors believe that the area could never be
decontaminated and the adverse effects of TCDD on
humans are witnessed to this day.
Yet, traditionally, the severity of an accident is measured
by the number of fatalities it causes. On 12 March 1995 a
tanker carrying benzene crashed into a passenger bus and a
tractor on a highway, about 50 km from the city of Chennai
(Madras). The triple accident caused the tanker to explode.
The resulting missiles, shock waves and ® re-ball killed 150
people7. Had the same event occurred after the tanker had
entered the populous Chennai city, the number of fatalities
would have run into thousands, and the accident would have
assumed the dimensions of a notorious disaster.
Indeed, the number of fatalities is a very important
parameter in assessing the damage potential of an accident.
But there are many other parameters which have more or
less the same importance and contribute in equal measures
to the damage potential of an accident. These include long-
term contamination of the environment, damage to property
and other support systems which bring socio-economic
depression in the areas surrounding the accident sites,
trauma caused to injuredÐ especially debilitated±persons,
and to the relatives of the deceased.
To characterize the hazard associated with any process
industry, it is essential that all the probable accident
scenarios are identi® ed, their magnitudes quanti® ed, their
impacts assessed, and the knowledge used to work out net
losses of lives, assets, and damage to ecosystems. But such
an elaborate study of the likely causes, likely accidents, and
likely consequences would require substantial input of
expert personnel, time and money. If one has to screen a
large number of industries and industrial sites within a short
span of time and limited budget, it is necessary to have an
appropriate ranking technique which is quick to execute yet
has adequate accuracy and precision. In the literature we
® nd reports on the identi® cation and ranking of hazards in
process industries; the noteworthy among these include the
Dow Index8,9, Mond Index10 and Toxicity Index11. We, too,
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have developed a indexÐ HIRA (Hazard Identi® cation and
RAnking) for this purpose. But all these indices take into
account only the premises of the industries and do not
consider the surrounding population, environment, and
assets at all. But, as elaborated earlier, these factors can
have a very strong in¯ uence on the damage caused by
accidents. These factors determine the real magnitude of an
accident’ s adverse impacts. Furthermore they must be taken
into consideration when deciding on the location of new
industries from among the various potential sites.
Keller et al.12, Wyler and Bohnenblust1 and Christen et
al.13 have proposed schemes to rank past accidents keeping
some site characteristics in view but these schemes can only
be used to rank accidents that have already occurred and not
in forecasting the damage likely to occur at different sites
from the same type of accident. Among these the scheme
proposed by Christen et al.13 is the most modern and takes
into account many parameters. It uses a scale of 0 to 1 to
characterize the severity of an accident. However, it does
not incorporate site-speci® c attributes such as proximity
to sensitive ecosystems, and nature of support facilities,
medical care, ® re-® ghting, transportation, etc.
To overcome the aforesaid limitations, the authors have
proposed a scheme to rank probable accidents or those
which have already occurred. This index can be used as a
tool to rank an industry in terms of hazard to the plant as
well as the surroundings. The technique incorporates the
effect of various parameters such as chemicals in use, site
characteristics, direct/indirect damage to surrounding popu-
lation and the environment. A brief description of the
importance of the various parameters and the methods used
to calculate the index is presented below.
ACCIDENT HAZARD INDEX
The accident hazard index (AHI) represents the con-
sequences of an accident on a standard scale (1±10). The
procedure is shown in Figure 1. The process begins with the
anticipation of the most credible accident scenario. The
accident scenario is developed to estimate potential damage,
and the impact of other factors on the severity of the
accident is evaluated. These factors in¯ uence the severity of
an accident in two ways:
· direct impact;
· indirect impact.
Direct impacts are due to those parameters which are
directly related to the accident’ s consequences and have
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Table 1. Comparison of index values for accidents1,4,5,13 .
Financial Christen’ s Accident hazard
loss, disaster Signi® cance index (AHI) Signi® cance
Accident Event (s) Deaths million $ index (DI)11 as per DI g(x) h(y) AHI as per AHI
Flixborough (1974) Explosion + ® re 28 450 0.50 Severe accident 6.5 3.7 7.5 Severe accident
Beek (1975) Explosion + ® re 14 10 0.33 Incident 3.5 2.7 4.4 Accident
Seveso (1976) Toxic release ± 350 0.70 Catastrophe 6.5 5.5 8.5 Catastrophe
Dhurabar (1983) Explosion + ® re 47 25 0.34 Incident 5.8 3.1 6.5 Severe accident
Cubatao (1984) Fire 100 50 0.43 Severe accident 4.3 3.5 5.5 Severe accident
Bhopal (1984) Toxic release 2500 350 1.0 Catastrophe 10.0 5.4 10.0 Catastrophe
Basel (1986) Fire+ toxic release ± 245 0.51 Catastrophe 5.5 3.8 6.7 Severe accident
Arzamas (1988) Explosion+ ® re 23 55 0.57 Catastrophe 5.5 4.1 6.8 Severe accident
Ufa (1989) Explosion+ toxic release 7 570 0.75 Catastrophe 7.5 4.6 8.8 Catastrophe
Bangkok (1990) Fire + toxic release 17 55 0.41 Severe accident 3.5 3.3 4.8 Accident
Bombay (1990) Fire 10 145 0.46 Severe accident 4.4 3.1 5.4 Severe accident
Panipat (1993) Explosion + toxic release 3 85 0.39 Incident 3.7 3.5 5.1 Severe accident
Dronka (1994) Toxic release 4 25 0.33 Incident 3.4 2.7 4.3 Accident
Madras (1995) Explosion + ® re 150 45 0.57 Catastrophe 6.1 2.1 6.4 Severe accident
Bombay (1996) Fire 2 150 0.27 Incident 3.5 1.8 3.9 Accident
g(x) represent value of damage potential as well as direct impact.
h(y) represent value of indirect impact.
Figure 1. Systematic procedure of AHI computation.
instant (with a maximum delay of few hours) effects. The





The indirect impacts are due to those parameters which
are indirectly related to the accident’ s consequences. The





These impacts (direct and indirect) make a major
contribution to characterizing an accident’ s severity. The
stages of the AHI algorithm and the method to quantify
direct and indirect impacts are discussed in detail in
subsequent sections.
ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
An accident scenario is a description of an expected
situation. It basically depicts different likely events that may
occur in an industry leading to an accident. The expectation
of a scenario does not mean it will occur, but it means it has
a reasonable probability of occurrence. Accident scenarios
are generated based on the properties of chemicals handled
by the industry, physical conditions under which reactions
occur or reactants/products are stored, geometry and
material strengths of the vessels and conduits involved,
valves and safety arrangements, etc. External factors such as
site characteristics (topography, presence of trees, ponds,
rivers in the vicinity, proximity to other industries or
residential areas, etc.) and meterological conditions are also
considered.
The construction of an accident scenario achieves the
following objectives:
(1) It is the basis of a risk study; it tells us what may happen
so that we can devise ways and means of preventing or
minimizing the possibility of an accident.
(2) An accident scenario forms a focal point of an heuristic
process. It uses the wisdom of hindsight (experiences of past
accidents) and state-of-the-art knowledge in forecasting
accident situations. The forecast generates new knowledge.
An accident scenario is thus a reference point as well as a
link between the past, present and future.
At this stage of AHI calculation an accident scenario is
generated for the industry under study. It is a very important
input for the subsequent stages. The more realistic the
accident scenario, the more accurate is the forecasting of the
type of accident, its consequences and associated risks.
From the studies reported in literature14,15,16 one gathers
that generally the authors have considered only one or a few
more obvious accident scenarios, omitting several other
credible accidents from consideration. We have discussed
this aspect in detail elsewhere3,5, showing how the entire
complexion of the risk assessment and disaster prevention/
management strategies can change if the scenarios of
all credible accidents are taken into consideration. For
example, the scenario for an accident in an ethylene storage
vessel (storage under high pressure in the lique® ed state) is
generally visualized as a con® ned vapour cloud explosion
(CVCE) followed by a ® re-ball. A high pressure build-up in
the storage vessel, either due to external heat absorption or
to a runaway reaction caused by the presence of impurities,
leads the vessel to fail with a CVCE and, as the released
chemical is highly ¯ ammable, a ® re-ball is generated. But a
toxic release may also occur, leading to overpressure load
along with toxic load due to the violence of the sudden
release. Unless all such credible accidents are considered
and their impacts carefully evaluated, one can miss out on
the various possibilities and the damage control exercises
are accordingly incomplete and inadequate.
Visualization of such accident scenarios can be achieved
by analysing the chemical characteristics and operating
conditions in detail with the help of thermodynamic, heat
transfer and ¯ uid dynamics models. The logistics associated
with generation of scenarios are presented in Figure 2.
ESTIMATION OF DAMAGE POTENTIAL
This stage estimates the damage potential of the
developed accident scenario. The assessment of damage
potential involves a wide variety of mathematical models. In
the present study the three main damaging effects
considered are heat load, blast wave (overpressure) and
toxic load. To make the assessment easier, simpli® ed
equations have been developed to calculate three different
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Figure 2. Logistics associated with the generation of scenarios.
factors (one for each damaging effect). These equations are
derived from detailed analysis of each effect and are based
on the formulations of References 4, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and
22. A brief explanation of each damaging event is given
below.
Heat Load
The damage potential due to heat load can be estimated
using:
R = K1(Hcm)1/ 2 (1)
X1 = f 1(R) (2)
where K1 is a constant with a value of 51, Hc is heat of
combustion (kJ kg-1) and m is the quantity of chemical
involved in the event (kg). All parameters are measured in
SI units.
The factor R is used to predict severity factor X1
using Figure 3. Figure 3 has been produced by a detailed
study of heat load potential and its impact on the
surroundings. A scale of 0±10 has been used to characterize
this factor. The characterization was done with reference to
the literature4,13,20,21.
Overpressure Load
The effect of overpressure can be quanti® ed as:
R = K2(Hcm); where K2 = 7.0 ´10-06 (3)
X2 = f 2(R) (4)
The severity factor X2 is a measure of the severity of
damage potential due to overpressure on a scale of 0±10. X2
can be estimated using Figure 4. This severity factor was
designed using equations reported in References 18, 22, 23
and 24.
Toxic Load
The consequencesdue to toxic effect can be quanti® ed as:
R = (q / LC50)1 / 3 (5)
X3 = f 3(R) (6)
where q represents quantity released (kg) in one hour
(release rate´one hour) for continuous release and total
quantity release (kg) for instantaneous release, and LC50
(based on an exposure time of 4 hours11,17) represents lethal
concentration (50% chance of lethality) (kgm-3). This
severity factor X3 can be estimated using Figure 5. The
® gure assumes dispersion under slightly unstable conditions
over ¯ at terrain and instantaneous exposure (short-term
exposure limit) through inhalation17.
DIRECT IMPACT FACTORS
The severity factors X1, X2 and X3 estimated at the
previous stage represent the severity of each damaging
effect due to the inherent characteristics of the industry or
process. As discussed earlier, the direct impact parameters
are also major contributors to the severity. In this section,
the effect of these parameters is discussed in detail and the
weightage (penalty) will be estimated for each parameter.
Population
As mentioned earlier, population density is one of the
important factors which contribute to the severity of an
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Figure 3. Pro® le of severity factor X1 due to heat load.
Figure 4. Pro® le of severity factor X2 due to toxic load.
Figure 5. Pro® le of severity factor X3 due to overpressure.
accident. For example, an accident occurring in Connaught
Place (a congested market place), New Delhi (population
density 6139 person/km2) will have much more disastrous
consequences compared to exactly the same accident
occurring in Jaselmair (a desert area), Rajasthan (population
density 9 person/km2). The impact of population on the
severity of an accident is assessed by the penalty Pn1 which
is a function of population density of the area. The penalty
has a maximum value of 1, corresponding to the population
density of Connaught Place, and a minimum value of 0,
corresponding to Jaselmair. The penalty of any intermediate
population density can be estimated using Figure 6. Figure 6
has been drawn with reference to Keller et al.12, Wyler and
Bohnenblust1, TNO19 (1992) and with the recommendations
of experts25,26.
Pn1 = g1 (Population density) (7)
Asset
Loss of assets is another very important factor contribut-
ing to the severity of an accident’ s impact. This type of
impact is assessed through the penalty Pn2. It is a function
of the asset density of the area. The maximum value of Pn2
is 1 for a market place (Connaught Place) and a value of 0 is
given for a remote area. Intermediate values of the penalty
can be drawn using Figure 7.
Pn2 = g2 (Asset density) (8)
Ecosystem
Impacts of accidents on the surrounding ecosystems have
rarely been considered because such impacts are much less
visible than loss of lives and assets. But damage to ecosystems
can have serious long-term consequences. For example, the
release of TCDD (tetrachloro dibenzo dioxin) at Seveso, Italy
(Abbasi et al.6) and pesticides at Basel, Switzerland (Christen
et al.13) caused long-term contamination of the environment
with long-lasting adverse impacts.
The impact on the ecosystem is assessed in terms of the
area affected by the accident. Further, high penalties are
assigned if some sensitive or important ecosystem happens
to come within the periphery of an accident. Figure 8 is
tentatively suggested based on a Delphi study to draw a
penalty for this parameter. This ® gure may be re® ned in due
course with the help of a more comprehensive Delphi study
involving large numbers of experts across the world.
Pn3 = g3 (Area of ecosystem) (9)
The penalties estimated above are used to upgrade the
severity parameters X1, X2 and X3.
INDIRECT IMPACT FACTORS
The indirect impact is a measure of the impact on
accident severity of the parameters which are dependent on
the accident but have secondary effects. For example, a
release of hazardous liquid may contaminate water, part of
the liquid may evaporate and hence contaminate the air and
some liquid may be absorbed by the soil and so contaminate
the land. Thus, release of a hazardous chemicals affects the
air, water and soil environment which later affects living
organisms including humans.
The curves to assess the weightage of such impacts are
presented in Figures 9±11. In order to develop these index
components for the indirect impacts, we have once again
taken recourse to a Delphi study as there is no other means to
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Figure 6. Curve for penalty estimation to assess damage to the population.
Figure 7. Curve for penalty estimation to assess loss of asset.
Figure 8. Curve for penalty estimation for ecosystem damage.
provide an `importance’ weightage for such impacts (Arya
and Abbasi25,26). In due course the componentscan be re® ned
by a more comprehensive Delphi study.
INDEX COMPUTATION
As discussed earlier, AHI is a function of damage
potential, direct impact and indirect impact, and hence can
be expressed as:
AHI = F(g(x), h(y))
= minimum of (10, (g(x)2 + h(y)2)1/ 2) (10)
where g(x) is a function de® ning damage potential and
direct impact while h(y) is a function specifying indirect
impact.
The function g(x) can further be expanded as:
g(x)= minimum of [10, {{(g1(x1))p
+ (g2(x2))p + (g3(x3))p}´(1 + z)}1 / p] (11)
where 1,2,3 specify the damaging effects due to heat load,
peak overpressure and toxic release respectively, and p is a
fuzzy expression parameter. Studies1,13,27 suggest a p value
of 3.








[Xi(1 + Pn1)(1 + Pn2)(1 + Pn3)] (12)
where Xi represents the damage potential of a particular
effect and Pnj represents the penalty of the direct impact of
each parameter. The factor z represents the hazard
characteristics of the chemical. The National Fire Protection
Agency (NFPA) rating has been used to calculate z. The
rating is scaled down to a scale of 0 to 1 instead of 0 to 4
without affecting its signi® cance.
Similarly, the function for indirect impact h(y) can be
expanded as:
h(y)= minimum of [10, {(l1(y1))p
+ (l2(y2))p + (l3(y3))p}1 / p] (13)
where li(yi)i = 1, 2, 3 represents the indirect impact of an
accident on the different environments and 1,2,3 represent
the impact on the soil, water and air environments
respectively. The function li(yi)i = 1, 2, 3 can be further
explained as:
li(yi = 1 - 3)= f (hazardous properties, quantity of
release and condition of release) (14)
Curves to estimate li(yi) values are presented in Figures
9±11.
As mentioned earlier, AHI is categorized on a scale of 0
to 10, where severity of damage is at a maximum at a value
10 and at a minimum at 0. The classi® cation of accident
type and hazard potential according to AHI values is as
follows:
0±1Ð Normal operation (minor hazard)
1±3Ð Incident (low hazard)
3±5Ð Accident (high hazard)
5±8Ð Severe accident (severe hazard)
8±10Ð Catastrophe (extremely severe hazard)
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Figure 10. Indirect impact factors due to liquid releases; qsh represents
threshold quantity in kg.
Figure 11. Indirect impact factors due to gaseous releases; qsh represents
threshold quantity in kg.
Figure 9. Indirect impact factors due to solids deposited; qsh represents
threshold quantity in kg.
The classi® cationsÐ accident type and hazard poten-
tialÐ are interrelated. A minor hazard potential always
exists in any process operation (normal operating condi-
tions), whereas an accident may have a wide range of hazard
potentials from low to extremely severe. This is qualitative
classi® cation based on the values of the AHI index which
represent the severity of hazard. An industry or plant with an
AHI value greater than 3 requires a detailed evaluation of its
safety system, whereas a value higher than 8 requires
immediate action to identify vulnerable locations and
develop strategies to manage them.
CASE STUDY
The AHI value has been calculated for a number of past
accidents. The list of accidents and their corresponding
index values are presented in Table 1. The input data and
intermediate calculation results for the Bhopal accident are
presented in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. The results
presented in Table 1 are compared with the ratings proposed
by Christen et al.13; it is observed that the AHI’ s wide range
allows better characterization than the narrow band of
characterization of the disaster index ranking13, which has
lesser tolerance for any uncertainty in parameter estimation.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The indices reported thus far for ranking the severity of
accidents in the chemical process industries either do not
take into account the surroundings (population density,
assets and sensitive ecosystems) or do not possess features
to enable forecasting of impacts of likely accidents on the
surroundings.
In this paper we have emphasized the necessity for
consideration of the surroundings of an industry as crucial
inputs in determining the severity of accidents in the
industry. An elaborate Accident Hazard Index (AHI) has
been developed which incorporates direct and indirect
impacts of accidents in the chemical process industries on
the population, assets and ecosystems present within
striking distance of the accidents which have occurred, or
are likely to occur, in an industry. The special ability of AHI
to not only rank past accidents in terms of severity but also
to forecast the impacts of likely accidents makes it valuable
as a management tool in choosing between potential sites
when setting up a new industry.
NOMENCLATURE
f1 function relating heat load to severity of factor X1
f2 function relating overpressure load to severity factor X2
f3 function relating toxic load to severity factor X3
g1 function relating population impact to penalty Pn1
g2 function relating asset impact to penalty Pn2
g3 function relating ecosystem impact to penalty Pn3
Hc heat of combustion, kJ kg-1
LC50 lethal concentration, kgm
-3
m mass of chemical, kg
q chemical released, kg
Pn1 penalty due to population
Pn2 penalty due to asset
Pn3 penalty due to ecosystem
g(x) function representing direct impacts
h(y) function representing indirect impacts
X1 severity factor due to heat load
X2 severity factor due to overpressure load
z hazard characteristic of chemical
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